Cyberspies can’t count on anonymity any more.

The United States (and the private security firm Mandiant) stripped a PLA espionage unit of its cover two years ago with a detailed description of the unit’s individual hackers; that report was followed by federal indictments of members of the unit that described them and their activities is

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has issued its annual report. It reminds us that, while press and privacy campaigners have been hyperventilating over US intelligence programs, there are, you know, actual authoritarian governments at work in the United States — breaking into the networks of activists whom they dislike, newspapers whose sources

NIST has revised the draft cybersecurity framework that it released in August. What it published today is a “preliminary cybersecurity framework.” After comments, a final framework will be released in February.

I’ve been very critical of the draft released in August. NIST clearly worked to address the criticisms.

The result is a mixed

In my first post about NIST’s draft cybersecurity framework I explained its basic problem as a spur to better security: It doesn’t actually require companies to do much to improve their network security.

My second post argued that the framework’s privacy appendix, under the guise of protecting cybersecurity, actually creates a tough new privacy requirement

Following up on my earlier NIST post, it’s fair to ask why I think the NIST Cybersecurity Framework will be a regulatory disaster. After all, as I acknowledged in that post, NIST’s standards for cybersecurity are looking far less prescriptive than business feared. There’s not a “shall” or “should” to be found in NIST’s

Business and conservatives have been worried all year about the cybersecurity standards framework that NIST (the National Institute of Standards and Technology) is drafting. An executive order issued early this year, after cybersecurity legislation stalled on the Hill, told NIST to assemble a set of standards to address cyber risks. Once they’re adopted, the order

Will international law and diplomacy limit cyberwar? Those who believe in international “norms” for cyberwar usually argue that cyberattacks on financial institutions are beyond the pale.

For example, Harold Koh has declared the State Department’s view that cyberwarriors “must distinguish military objectives … from civilian objects, which under international law are generally protected from attack.”